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During the past ten years, the United States has loosened economic reg-
ulation and increased competition in many domestic industries, including
banking, telecommunications, airlines, railroads, trucking, and intercity
busing.' Although early signs suggest that domestic deregulation will be a
success,2 U.S. firms still face substantial barriers to competition in many
international markets. In ocean shipping and international aviation, for
example, the U.S. government has signed treaties that limit service be-
tween the United States and foreign countries and that divide markets
between the national carriers of each country.' In both industries, the U.S.
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I. For accounts of deregulation to date, see Moore, The Record on Rail and Truck Reform,
REGULATION, Nov.-Dec. 1983, at 33; Johnson, Why Local Rates Are Rising, REGULATION, July-
Aug. 1983, at 31; Cornell, Pelcovits & Brenner, A Legacy of Regulatory Failure, REGULATION, July-
Aug. 1983, at 37; BREAKING UP BELL: ESSAYS ON INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND REGULATION (D.
Evans ed. 1983); D. GRAHAM & D. KAPLAN, COMPETITION AND THE AIRLINES: AN EVALUATION OF
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2. In the airline industry, for example, deregulation appears to have reduced fares on routes and
improved the frequency of service to many small and medium-sized communities. Although some of
the established carriers suffered financial losses at first, several of the new low-cost air carriers are
profitable. The established carriers are recovering their financial health as the economy improves and
they reduce their costs to more competitive levels. For a more detailed review of the recent experience
under airline regulation, see THE EARLY EXPERIENCE, supra note 1; THE REBIRTH OF THE ENTRE-
PRENEURS, supra note 1.
3. For a comparison of the treaties and regulations that govern international air service and inter-
national ocean shipping, see BOOZ-ALLEN & HAMILTON, INC., COMPARISON OF THE COMPETITIVE-
NESS OF U.S. INTERNATIONAL AIRLINE AND MARITIME POLICIES (1978) (draft report to the U.S.
Dept. of Transportation).
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government also tolerates cartels that attempt to set prices and control
capacity.4
Many analysts of international markets concede that pro-competitive
policies are sensible for domestic industries, yet they argue that such poli-
cies are poorly suited for international industries in which foreign coun-
tries control major elements of the market.5 This Article examines two
specific arguments against pro-competitive policies in international mar-
kets. The first is that some form of market restraint or regulation is una-
voidable because many foreign governments strongly favor restraint or
regulation and have the power to impose it unilaterally.6 U.S. resistance
to foreign restrictions ultimately will prove futile, this argument runs, and
may lead to even more onerous forms of regulation than those currently
proposed. The second argument contends that U.S. companies will suffer
from various forms of unfair competition if the U.S. government opposes
regulation:7 If the United States insists on open competition, then foreign
companies may subsidize competition against U.S. companies with profits
earned in other protected markets.
This Article assesses the plausibility of these arguments in the context
of the international aviation and ocean shipping industries. The interna-
tional aviation industry is examined first (in Section I) because it offers
the opportunity to examine a shift in U.S. policy toward increased compe-
tition. Section II examines recent, anti-competitive developments in ocean
shipping and discusses how tactics similar to those pursued in aviation
could thwart those developments. Our analysis of both industries strongly
suggests that the first argument discussed above has little force. With suf-
ficient determination, the United States often can successfully resist for-
eign efforts to limit competition. The strength of the second argu-
ment-that U.S. companies will suffer from unfair competition if the
4. See id. at vi-x.
5. See, e.g., Ellsworth, Competition or Rationalization in the Liner Industry?, 10 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 497, 511 (1979) (discussing ocean shipping); The Crisis in International Aviation (May 4,
1981) (memorandum submitted to the Reagan Administration by Braniff International, The Flying
Tiger Line, Northwest Airlines, Pan American World Airways, and Trans World Airways) (paper
on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation).
6. For a discussion of arguments in favor of regulating international aviation, see Hammarskjold,
Trends in International Aviation Since World War II and Governmental Policies with Respect to
Routes, Rates, Charters, Capacity and Deregulation, (1979). PROC. INT'L AVIATION SYMP. 23, 23-25
(held at Kingston, Jamaica).
Restraints can be imposed unilaterally through the use of practices which discriminate against U.S.
carriers. For example, Japan allegedly excludes U.S. carriers from the U.S.-Japan airline market by
unilaterally imposing quota restrictions on U.S. carriers. International Air Transportation Competi-
tion: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Trans-
portation, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (statement of Edward J. Driscoll, President, National Air Carrier
Association).
7. See The Crisis in International Aviation, supra note 5, at 32.
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United States pursues a quixotic, pro-competitive policy-is less certain.
Although pro-competitive policies almost always help U.S. consumers and
the economy in general, they do not always help U.S. companies.' U.S.
airlines as a group, however, enjoy a strong competitive position and ap-
pear to have been helped rather than hurt by U.S. policy. Even U.S. ship-
ping lines, whose competitive position is weaker, do not seem much
threatened by exclusion from protected markets or by other unfair
practices.
I. The Experience with International Aviation
Although the United States traditionally has resisted pressures for re-
strictive international aviation agreements, it recently has shifted toward a
decidedly pro-competitive policy. In this section we review the history of
U.S. international aviation policy and discuss the basis-primarily bene-
fits to consumers-for this recent policy shift. We then advance a variety
of reasons for the recent success of the United States in negotiating liberal,
pro-competitive bilateral agreements. Finally, we suggest that U.S. air-
lines have not become victims of unfair competition from other countries.
A. A Brief History of US. Policy
Near the close of World War II, representatives of the Allied Powers
met in Chicago to discuss the future of international aviation. 9 The U.S.
government hoped the conference would produce a multilateral agreement
on "open skies," or unrestrained competition, in international aviation.
Their hopes were shattered,10 largely because the United Kingdom, the
second ranking civil aviation power, wanted closer government regulation
of international air service, including controls over prices and capacity. 1
The Allies' failure to agree on an "open skies" policy made it necessary to
negotiate a special bilateral agreement before aviation service could begin
8. Weak U.S. companies would prefer protected markets over open competition.
9. For a description of the dispute at the Chicago conference and the subsequent Bermuda I
agreement, see Stoffel, American Bilateral Air Transport Agreements on the Threshold of the Jet
Transport Age, 26 J. AIR L. & COM. 119, 120-23, 130 (1959). The United States proposed at Chi-
cago a multilateral agreement on five "freedoms of the air" modelled after the "freedoms of the sea."
These five freedoms were: (1) the right to fly through the airspace of another country without landing;
(2) the right to land in another country for servicing or other non-commercial purposes; (3) the right
to put down, in another country, passengers and cargo taken on in the home country; (4) the right to
pick up passengers and cargo in another country that are destined for the home country; and (5) the
right to pick up or set down passengers and cargo in another country that are destined for or originate
from a third country. A sixth freedom was later identified, which might be considered a combination
of the third and fourth freedoms. This freedom governs passengers that have neither their origin nor
destination in the home country but who stop in the home country for a period of time.
10. See Stoffel, supra note 9, at 121-22.
11. Id. at 121.
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between any two countries." Many such agreements have been negotiated
since 1944. U.S. policy toward these agreements has passed through three
distinct stages: the Bermuda I period (1946-77), the Bermuda II period
(1977-78) and the "open skies" period (1978-present).
1. Bermuda I (1946-1977)
The United States and the United Kingdom finally compromised in
1946 with the signing of the Bermuda I agreement. That agreement,
which governed civil aviation only between the two countries, also served
as a model for other bilateral agreements for the next thirty years.' Such
agreements are therefore referred to generically as "Bermuda I"
agreements.
Bermuda I agreements usually restrict the number of air carriers that
can serve the signatory countries and specify a number of "gateway" air-
ports where the airlines pick up or discharge international passengers."
They usually restrict carriage of passenger traffic bound to or from coun-
tries other than the two signatory countries, known as "fifth freedom"
traffic."s Bermuda I agreements also grant the International Air Trans-
port Association (IATA), an association of international airlines with
open membership, 6 substantial authority to negotiate and establish
fares.17 IATA's regional "Traffic Conferences" set airline rates by unani-
mous agreement.' 8 Countries usually retain, for their civil aviation au-
thorities, the right to review and approve the rates established by IATA."
In practice, however, IATA rates are routinely accepted. 0
Bermuda I agreements also provide some incentives for competition.
For example, they do not limit capacity by restricting the number of
12. In ocean shipping, by comparison, bilaterals are not usually needed because the freedom of
ships to call at any port has been widely accepted. BOoZ-ALLEN & HAMILTON, INC., supra note 3, at
53.
13. See International Aviation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1977) (statement of Julius Katz,
Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs, Dep't of State) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
14. See Stoffel, supra note 9, at 127-30.
15. Id. at 128-29.
16. Gazdik, Rate-Making and the IA TA Traffic Conferences, 16 J. AIR L. & COM. 298, 298-300
(1949).
17. See Stoffel, supra note 9, at 134.
18. See Gazdik, supra note 16, at 321. Recommendations for change in this procedure were made
at a special general meeting of IATA (Montreal, July 1978) and subsequently -adopted so that the
unanimous approval procedure no longer applies. See IATA, Recommendations of the Executive
Committee on Traffic Conference Procedures and Objectives 8 (July 1978); IATA, IATA REGULA.
lIONS, Section F, Traffic Conferences, at 8 (1978).
19. See id. at 303.
20. For a description of the IATA and ICAO rate-setting machinery in the period of Bermuda I,
see Gazdik, supra note 16.
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flights or the type of aircraft."' At the same time, they do not specifically
preclude agreements which effectively restrict capacity competition." As a
concession to the British, for example, the original Bermuda agreement
contained provisions for bilateral consultations on capacity if one party
found that the activities of foreign carriers injured its carriers." The
United States interpreted the Bermuda principles liberally, however, and
with few exceptions (mainly among communist bloc countries) success-
fully resisted the imposition of capacity controls. 4
Until the early 1960's, the international aviation system established by
Bermuda I bilaterals and IATA fare regulation worked smoothly. Because
IATA functioned as an effective fare-setting cartel, competition focused on
service, many aspects of which were eventually regulated by IATA as
well." Price competition came only from a few non-IATA airlines, such
as Icelandic, and a small number of charter operators."' The development
of jet aircraft and the subsequent reduction in real airfares, however,
eventually undermined the IATA fare structure and the profitability of
many foreign airlines. Lower fares made international vacations more af-
fordable and encouraged the expansion of low-cost charters.'7 At the same
time, many of the rules restricting charter operations were gradually lib-
eralized, often under pressure from the U.S. government." The explosion
in charter operations, many of which the scheduled airlines operated in
self-defense,"' drew passengers away from scheduled services and forced
IATA to authorize a variety of discount fares.30
IATA's problems were further complicated when many of the newly
21. See Stoffel, supra note 9, at 129-33. See also Doganis, Air Transport-A Case Study in
International Regulation, 7 J. TRANSPORT ECON. & POL'Y 109, 110-11 (1973).
22. See Doganis, supra note 21, at 111.
23. See Stoffel, supra note 9, at 129.
24. See id. at 129-30.
25. Because of service competition, IATA eventually was forced to set standards and prices for
drinks, headsets, in-flight movies, and the like. For example, one IATA service restriction which
received considerable publicity required that only "simple, inexpensive cold sandwiches" could be
offered to economy class passengers. This restriction became the subject of a complaint by Pan Am
and TWA against Air France, Scandinavian Airways System, Swissair and KLM. McGoldrik, Regu-
lation of Service Competition in International Air Travel, 8 HARV. INT'L L.J. 78, 101-02 (1967);
Friedlander, Sandwich Settlement, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1958, § II, pt. 2, at I, col. 4.
26. See Smithies, The Changing Demand for Air Transport: The North Atlantic Case, 1 J.
TRANSPORT ECON. & POLICY 231 (1973). This article provides a breakdown of North Atlantic pas-
senger travel over the 1960-1961 period. Most international airlines were IATA members at this time
and the CAB and the Congress were actively promoting the role of charters. Id. at 231, 234.
27. See Mutti and Murai, Airline Travel on the North Atlantic, 11 J. TRANSPORT ECON. &
POL'Y 45, 45-50, 51 (1977).
28. See Hammarskjold, supra note 6, at 32, for a brief history of U.S. support for charter
competition.
29. Smithies, supra note 26, at 239. IATA non-scheduled operations exceeded those of the non-
IATA non-scheduled operators from 1960 until 1967 on the North Atlantic routes. Id.
30. For a description of the growth of the charter market, see id. at 234-39.
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independent and developing countries established their own national air-
lines and extended their routes into international markets."' These new
airlines often provided more extensive service than normal commercial
considerations could justify, in part for the prestige of showing the nation-
al flag.82 Maintenance of these politically motivated operations, particu-
larly when run inefficiently, required substantial government subsidies. 8
As competition grew, an increasing number of European and third world
governments thought it foolish to pay subsidies to their national airlines
when capacity controls on foreign competition might reduce or eliminate
the need for subsidies altogether.34
2. Bermuda II (1977-1978)
Shortly after the 1973 oil crisis began, the United States agreed to tem-
porary capacity restrictions on flights to and from the United Kingdom as
a way to conserve fuel.88 When the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
rejected a British request to extend these controls in 1976,6 the British,
suffering from serious losses on government-owned British Airways, gave
the required one-year notice to terminate the Bermuda I agreement. 7
Negotiations led to a new agreement, referred to as Bermuda II, in
June 1977." The Bermuda II agreement broke precedent by limiting the
number of scheduled flights between the United States and the United
Kingdom and by giving each country an effective veto over changes in
market shares or number of flights. Although the agreement did not gov-
ern charters and raised the number of U.S. gateway airports from six to
fourteen, it also reduced the number of U.S. carriers allowed to serve each
gateway airport and curtailed U.S. carriers' right to carry "fifth freedom"
traffic.8 9
31. For a discussion of airlines in the developing countries, see M. STRASZHEIM, THE INTERNA.
TIONAL AIRLINE INDUSTRY 13, 15, 26 (1969).
32. Id. at 15-16.
33. See id. at 24, 25.
34. The United States-United Kingdom market provides a good example of the imbalance
brought about by the competition allowed under the relatively unrestricted capacity clause of the
Bermuda I agreement and the multiple carrier designation then in effect. In 1976, the British in-
formed the U.S. government that, according to British calculations, the revenues of U.S. airlines under
Bermuda I were more than double those of U.K. airlines. See Hearings, supra note 12, at 94-100
(statement of Chester C. Davenport, Assistant Secretary for Policy Plans and International Affairs,
Dep't of Transportation).
35. For a discussion of the history of the Bermuda II agreement, see N. TANEJA, U.S. INTERNA-
TIONAL AVIATION POLICY 20-25 (1980).
36. See id. at 20.
37. See id. at 20-21. See also Barnum, Carter Administration Stumbles at Bermuda, REGULA-
TION, Jan.-Feb., 1978, at 20.
38. Agreement on International Aviation, July 23, 1977, United States-Great Britain, T.I.A.S.
No. 8641.
39. See Hearings, supra note 13, at 72-74 (statement of Alan Boyd, Special Ambassador to the
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3. Open skies (1978-present)
Critics quickly attacked the Bermuda II agreement as a reversal of past
U.S. policy and as inconsistent with efforts to deregulate the domestic air-
line industry.' In 1977, Alfred Kahn, newly appointed CAB chairman,
decided that the Bermuda II agreement would not serve as the model for
future U.S. bilateral agreements and that the United States would return
to its "open skies" policy of promoting competition.' The CAB then ne-
gotiated a bilateral agreement with Belgium in 1977-1978 which con-
tained no capacity controls and extremely liberal provisions relating to
charter flights, gateway airports, and "fifth freedom" traffic.' 2 Congress
also signaled its displeasure with Bermuda II and its support for Kahn's
position by passing the International Air Transportation Competition Act
of 19 79 ,"s which established liberal agreements on fares, operations, gate-
ways, and charters as goals of U.S. aviation policy."4
B. The Policy Behind "Open Skies"
The renewed U.S. interest in an "open skies" policy resulted not simply
from tradition, but also from a belief that restrictive aviation agreements
harm air travellers and the economy in general. By controlling fares, in-
flight services, and capacity, restrictive agreements reduce competitive
pressures for carriers to improve efficiency or to offer more attractive ser-
vices and fares.4 Nevertheless, foreign governments often favor such
agreements, particularly if their national carriers are so weak or ineffi-
cient that the airlines might otherwise require a subsidy to maintain their
market positions.
Recent research, conducted as part of the Harvard University Airline
Deregulation Project, supports the view that liberal bilateral agreements
benefit aviation travellers. Using a recently developed classification scheme
which ranks agreements according to their degree of liberality in pricing,
capacity, "fifth freedom," and charter provisions,' 6 the bilateral aviation
United States-United Kingdom Bilateral Air Transport Negotiations).
40. See Barnum, supra note 37, at 18-30.
41. See Hearings, supra note 13, at 4 (statement of Alfred Kahn, Chairman, CAB).
42. Agreement on International Aviation, Oct. 24, 1977, and Nov. 16, 1977, United States-
Belgium, T.I.A.S. No. 8923.
43. Pub. L. No. 96-192, 94 Stat. 35 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
44. Id. § 2, 94 Stat. 35-36 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1982)) ("Declaration of Policy").
45. For arguments in favor of reduced regulation, see N. TANEJA, supra note 35, at 55. For
arguments regarding the U.S. domestic market, see C. BARNEKOV, INTERNATIONAL AIR FARE LEVELS:
AN EVALUATION AFTER THREE DECADES OF IATA RATEMAKING 6 (1978) (report prepared for U.S.
Dep't of Transportation under Contract DOT-P-50-78-47).
46. In a forthcoming book on U.S. international aviation policy, Ivor Morgan uses an index of
liberality giving two points for agreements that require mutual disapproval before tariff rejection, one
point if fares may be disapproved by the country of flight origin, and one point each for the absence of
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agreements between the United States and many third world countries are
not very liberal.47 Neither are those with Japan and several major Euro-
pean countries, including Spain, France, and Italy." Nevertheless, the
United States has been able to negotiate liberal bilateral agreements with
countries in every major part of the world, including such key European
nations as Belgium, Netherlands, West Germany, and even Britain.49
One measure of the consumer benefits produced by liberal agreements
is the rapid growth of air travel in markets governed by those agreements.
Table 1 shows that between 1975 and 1981, for example, air travel be-
tween the United States and three European countries with liberal bilat-
eral agreements grew by 72 percent, but travel between the United States
and three European countries with restrictive agreements grew by only 21
percent.50 Similarly, air travel grew by 194 percent between the United
States and Korea and the United States and Singapore, where liberal bi-
lateral agreements were in force, but by only 49 percent between the
United States and Japan, where a more restrictive agreement was in ef-
fect. Moreover, as Table 1 shows, the growth rates in the two types of
markets diverged only during the years when the liberal bilateral agree-
ments were in force.
capacity restrictions, liberal fifth freedom rights, and liberal charter rights. The points are added to
form an index number, giving a maximum of five points for a "liberal" agreement. The weighting of
the points in this fashion is subjective. Weight could also be given to language in bilateral agreements
specifically aimed at removing discriminatory practices. However, such clauses are invariably present
in bilaterals with index scores of more than three. These unpublished calculations are on file with




50. These calculations were based on data found in U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, U.S. IN-
TERNATIONAL AIR TRAVEL STATISTICS (1975-1981).
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TABLE I
Annual Percentage Growth Rates In Air Travel Markets
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1976



















13.7 4.0 9.4 18.6* 11.0 1.3 72
4.7 5.0 9.4 6.8 (4.3) (1.9) 21
8.7 0.5 3.5 65.2* 50.9 4.5 194
4.0 1.9 6.7 19.9 4.3 5.5 49
*Year that liberalized bilateral agreement was negotiated. The Korean agreement was negotiated in
1979 while the Singapore agreement was negotiated in 1977.
SOURCE: Calculated from U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service data by Ivor P. Morgan.
Air travel increased where liberal bilateral agreements were in force
largely because of the fare reductions spawned by liberal agreements. Ta-
ble 2 compares estimates of international airfares in various regions of the
world and for various distances with U.S. domestic coach fares for the
same distances. 1 During the period from 1976 to 1980, international
fares declined relative to domestic fares in a large number of markets and
mileage blocks. All but one of the markets in which fares declined by 10
percent or more involved the United States and were influenced by the
open skies policy. By contrast, international fares did not decline relative
51. U.S. domestic airfares were calculated using the CAB formula for the Standard Industry Fare
Level (SIFL).
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to domestic fares for markets, such as those within Europe, in which U.S.
policy has little influence.
International Markets
TABLE 2
Ratio Of International Economy Air Fares To Domestic Fares
To Similar Distances
Percent Change

































1.13 1.06 1.01 .87 .87 (23)
1.29 1.11 1.10









1.52 1.51 1.50 1.26 1.25
1.65 1.73 1.82 1.50 1.51
2.23 2.21 2.43 2.05 2.09
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The declining importance of the charter market also reflects the effects
of the open skies policy on regular fare levels. In 1977, charter travel
reached a peak of 16 percent of all U.S.-foreign air travel and 27 percent
of all air travel between the United States and Europe.52 After scheduled
airlines began discounting, however, charter passenger travel fell to only 5
percent of all U.S.-foreign trips and 6 percent of all U.S.-European trips
in 1981.58 The charters' share of the critical North Atlantic market in
1981 was lower than it had been since the late 1950's.'4
C. The United States' Success in Fostering Competition
The United States has not found much foreign support for liberal avia-
tion agreements, despite the apparent benefits for travellers. The United
States, however, has been able to insist successfully on liberal bilateral
terms even with some countries which would have preferred restrictive
agreements. The history of U.S. aviation policy during the open skies pe-
riod suggests several factors which aid in negotiating a liberal agreement
and affect its subsequent administration: a free-market ideology, a com-
petitive national airline, and the threat of diverting air traffic to other
modes or countries. The first two factors come into play only occasionally;
in Europe, for example, only Iceland and Luxembourg have steadfastly
supported the competitive market philosophy embodied in the U.S. open
skies policy. 5 Furthermore, only a few countries, such as Singapore, have
such aggressive and profitable national carriers that they would benefit
unambiguously from more competition.' In most cases, therefore, the key
to successful negotiation appears to be the threat that a restrictive agree-
ment might raise airfares and thereby divert travellers away from the
scheduled carriers of the bilateral market under negotiation. The rapid
growth of markets governed by liberal bilateral agreements, as shown in
Table 1, demonstrates the potential power of traffic diversion.
The vulnerability of a particular country to this threat depends, of
course, on the particular characteristics of its air travel markets. For ex'-
ample, the threat of diversion is higher where competing charter air ser-
vice is available. Although some governments have thought that charters
52. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, U.S. INTERNATIONAL AIR TRAVEL STATISTICS, CALEN.
DAR YEAR 1977 (REVISED) la-i, Ia-2, Id-1, Id-2 (1978).
53. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, U.S. INTERNATIONAL AIR TRAVEL STATISTICS, CALEN-
DAR YEAR 1981, at Ia-I, la-2, Id-I, Id-2 (1982).
54. Charter shares have increased since 1981. See IATA, WORLD AIR TRANSPORT STATISTICS 10
(1983).
55. Doganis, supra note 21, at 117.
56. See, e.g., Kraar, Flying High With the "Singapore Girls", FORTUNE, June 18, 1979, at 132,
132-33.
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serve a different market segment," studies of the demand for international
air travel demonstrate that the cross elasticity5" between charter and
scheduled carriers is extremely high. 9 Charter service also played a cen-
tral role in limiting IATA's fare-setting ability during the Bermuda I pe-
riod."0 Charter operations have fallen off dramatically since the scheduled
airlines began to offer competitive discount fares,6 but the threat of their
return helps keep scheduled airline fares in check.
Even where no charter service exists, there is often a significant risk
that higher airfares will divert travelers to other countries or out of the
market altogether. Airfares are a large portion of total travel costs, partic-
ularly for long distance travel, and much vacation and business travel is
sensitive to transportation prices.6" Many Americans vacationing in Eu-
rope, for example, may regard landing in Brussels as a close substitute for
landing in London or Paris.
Another market characteristic which affects the vulnerability of a coun-
try to the threat of diversion is the importance of tourism to the country's
economy. Vacations in the Caribbean, or even at home, can substitute for
vacations in Europe. The more a country depends on tourism, the more
sensitive it will be to the threat of diversion. Even many categories of
business travel are relatively sensitive to price;6" hence non-tourist econo-
mies are not completely safe from diversion.
U.S. experience in negotiating bilateral agreements illustrates the im-
portance of these market characteristics in implementing pro-competitive
policies. The United States has been relatively successful in obtaining lib-
eral agreements in Europe because tourism is important there; the threat
that higher airfares might divert travelers to charter service-or to other
countries-is extremely effective. Even the United Kingdom has agreed to
57. Some countries, for example, have allowed relatively liberal charter rules while restricting
scheduled air service. This was a response to pressure from their tourist industries and was based on
the belief that charters serve a different market segment. Charter travel within Europe is reported to
be 55% of the total market measured in revenue passenger kilometers. Association of European Air-
lines, Traffic and Operating Data of AEA Airlines 1977-1979, at 18 (1980). This high percentage
further increases pressures on European governments to maintain liberal charter rules. In addition,
scheduled air carriers may view charter service as their only opportunity for expansion when sched-
uled service is governed by capacity controls.
58, Cross elasticity of demand is defined as the absolute value of the percentage change in the
quantity demanded of one good in response to a one percent increase in the price of another. See R.
LIPSEY, P. STEINER & D. PURVIS, ECONOMICS 92 (7th ed. 1983).
59. See Straszheim, Airline Demand Functions in the North Atlantic and the Pricing Implica-
tions, 12 J. TRANSPORT ECON. & POL'Y 179 (1978); see also Mutti & Murai, supra note 27, at 49-
51.
60. Smithies, supra note 24, at 237; N. TANEJA, supra note 35, at 80.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
62. Self-employed professionals or independent businessmen, for example, are likely to be con-
scious of travel budgets if they are paid from their gross profits.
63. See supra note 62.
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liberalize the Bermuda II agreement several times since 1978,64 after the
United States negotiated liberal agreements with neighboring Belgium
and the Netherlands.6" On the other hand, the failure of the United States
to negotiate liberal bilateral agreements with Japan and many African
nations probably reflects the insensitivity of these markets to diversion.
With few exceptions, tourism is not very important to these countries'
economies. 6
The threat of diversion thus largely explains the pattern of U.S. bilat-
eral agreements. The evidence suggests that this threat can be employed to
persuade other countries to adopt similar pro-competitive policies. This
clearly contradicts the argument that regulation and restraint are inevita-
ble in international markets.
D. The Absence of Unfair Competition
The airline experience also casts doubt on the second argument against
U.S. efforts to promote competition in international markets: that other
countries might successfully engage in unfair competition against U.S.
firms. Although the evidence is too limited to permit a firm conclusion,
research suggests that U.S. airlines generally have benefited from open
skies policies through increased market shares and improved profitability.
Table 3 gives data on market shares for the period 1976-1981. It shows
that, despite the slight decline in the average market share of U.S. carri-
ers, liberal agreements led to increased shares. In four of the six European
and Far Eastern markets governed by liberal agreements, the U.S. share
increased-significantly in some cases. Moreover, in Singapore, one of
only two liberal markets where the U.S. share declined, the decline oc-
curred because a foreign carrier destroyed a monopoly previously enjoyed
by a U.S. carrier.
64. For example, on March 17, 1978, the agreement with the United Kingdom was amended to
include further innovation in fares, particularly low-cost fares. On April 1, 1978, a liberalized charter
agreement was reached between the countries concerning country-of-origin pricing. In November
1978, the earlier low-cost fare experiments were extended, and reduction of government intervention
was made an aim of the agreement. In December 1980, the agreement again was amended to open
more routes between the two countries to service by multiple U.S. carriers. See Amendment, Nov. 9,
1978, United States-United Kingdom, 30 U.S.T. 979, T.I.A.S. No. 9231; Amendment, Dec. 27, 1979,
United States-United Kingdom, 32 U.S.T. 525, T.I.A.S. No. 9722.
65. See, e.g., Agreement on International Aviation, supra note 42.
66. For statistical information on international tourism, see generally STATISTICAL OFFICE, U.N.
DEPT. OF INT'L ECON. AND SOC. AFF., 1981 STATISTICAL Y.B., 1041-44 (1983).
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TABLE 3
Market Shares Of U.S. Air Carriers
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
All U.S.-Foreign
markets 50.2 50.2 50.4 50.0 50.8 49.1 48.7
All U.S.-European
markets 44.0 45.4 45.4 43.9 44.2 42.1 41.0
All U.S.-Far East





Belgium 29.4 30.8 22.1 21.2* 36.5 44.5 39.1
Netherlands 14.2 8.6 8.6 11.6* 23.4 12.3 7.3
W. Germany 43.2 50.5 49.1 44.4* 45.3 50.6 46.4





Singapore 99.6 99.5 97.5* 96.5 21.5 22.6 18.0
S. Korea 18.7 21.1 11.8 6.5 13.2* 18.5 20.7
*Year that liberalized bilateral agreement was negotiated.
SOURCE: Calculated from U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service data by Ivor P. Morgan.
Liberal agreements also appear to have helped, or at least not hurt, the
profitability of U.S. airlines. Although several major U.S. international
carriers lost money during the 1981-1982 recession, many of the newer
U.S. entrants were profitable."7 Recently, moreover, the two largest tradi-
tional carriers also have shown considerable improvement in profitabil-
ity."8 These facts suggest that unfair competition, if it exists, has not un-
dermined the long-run competitive position of U.S. airlines.
67. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, INCOME STATEMENT OF CERTIFICATED ROUTE CARRIERS 13, 31
(1980).
68. Pan Am went from an operating loss of $115 million in 1981 to an operating profit of $240
million in 1983 on its international routes. See PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC., 1983 ANNUAL
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II. The Prospects for Ocean Shipping
Trade restrictions, known as "cargo reservation" agreements, have been
proposed for international shipping.69 Those who urge U.S. acquiescence
to this proposal have marshalled the same arguments which we have ex-
amined in the aviation context. As the U.S. experience with aviation re-
strictions suggests, however, the United States can successfully resist new
restrictions on shipping and would benefit from doing so.
This section describes how and why the United States should resist
these restrictive agreements. It first provides background information on
the shipping industry, recent cargo reservation proposals, and U.S. mari-
time policy. It then explains why the United States should not accept
these proposals and, applying the lessons of the aviation experience, de-
scribes how the United States can prevent or neutralize cargo reservation
agreements. Finally, it explains why the United States probably should
not fear retaliatory measures by other countries or their carriers.
A. The Movement for Cargo Reservation
Ocean shipping and international aviation differ in several relevant re-
spects. It is thus important to understand the characteristics and regula-
tory environment of the ocean shipping industry before attempting to ap-
ply the lessons of the aviation experience to U.S. maritime policy.
1. Liner Shipping and Conferences
Recent pressure in the ocean shipping industry to reserve or allocate
cargo among the vessels of different nations has focused largely on one
segment of the industry: cargo liners.=° Liners are the common carriers of
the ocean shipping industry, selling space for high-value general cargo
(rather than bulk commodities) moving on regular schedules and along
established routes.7 ' Liners carry about 40 percent by value (although less
than 10 percent by weight) of oceanborne U.S. imports and exportsY.7  In
addition to cargo liners, there are three other types of ocean carriers: pro-
REPORT 42 (1984). TWA international operating income improved from $62 million in 1981 to $160
million in 1983. See TRANS WORLD AIRWAYS, INC., 1983 ANNUAL REPORT 2, 37 (1984).
69. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has adopted anti-
competitive measures relating to "cargo reservation" which may soon go into effect, UNCTAD Code
Nears Force; Need for U.S. Action Cited, CONTAINER NEWS, June 1981, at 28, and many developing
countries have announced their intention to apply certain restrictive provisions unilaterally to their
trades with other countries. See infra text accompanying notes 102-03.
70. E. BENNATHAN & A. WALTERS, THE ECONOMICS OF OCEAN FREIGHT RATES 1-4 (1969).
71. For a general description of the ocean shipping industry, see B. ABRAHANSON, INTERNA-
TIONAL OCEAN SHIPPING (1980); E. FRANKEL, REGULATION AND POLICIES OF AMERICAN SHIPPING
(1982).
72. See E. FRANKEL, supra note 71, at 121-22.
Vol. 2: 107, 1984
International Markets
prietary ships-such as oil tankers and ore ships-that are owned by indi-
vidual companies to carry their own goods; independent ships-primarily
bulk carriers-that are leased by a company for a limited period; and
tramp ships-either general cargo or bulk carriers-that travel particular
routes like liners, but are not limited to a regular schedule or to one type
of cargo or one company.
Since the turn of the century, liner shipping throughout the world has
been organized into conferences that coordinate rates and schedules among
companies.7 3 A separate conference governs each trade route, or "trade,"
and different conferences may control inbound and outbound cargo on the
same route.7 Some of the approximately 400 liner conferences worldwide
have as few as two members, while others govern several dozen compa-
nies. 7 1 Most liner companies belong to more than one conference, but
some remain independent and gain business by charging lower rates."6
Conferences compete against independents by offering more frequent ser-
vice and by giving a discount-usually 15 percent-to customers that
agree to deal exclusively with their ships.
77
Liner conferences behave like cartels in that they establish uniform
rates, set schedules, allocate markets, and sometimes pool cargo or reve-
nue. 78 Although such practices normally are illegal under U.S. law,7 9 the
Shipping Act of 191680 granted liners in U.S. trade routes special anti-
trust immunity in return for Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) au-
thority to regulate their behavior. The Shipping Act, as amended, gives
the FMC power to review conference agreements,8 prohibits certain
predatory behavior," and requires "open" conference membership, 3 (i.e.,
any carrier can join or quit any conference). The Act also allows the
73. For descriptions of the conference system, see id. at 214; B. DEAKIN & T. SEWARD, SHIPPING
CONFERENCES: A STUDY OF THEIR ORIGINS, DESTINATIONS, AND ECONOMIC PRACTICES (1973); Ben-
nathan & Walters, Shipping Conferences: An Economic Analysis, 4 J. MAR. L. & COM. 93 (1972).
74. E. BENNATHAN AND A. WALTERS, supra note 70, at 3.
75. See B. DEAKIN & T. SEWARD, supra note 73, at 225-251.
76. Id. at 53-64, 175-179.
77. Under the Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. § 813(a) (1982), the maximum loyalty rebate that
could be charged in a U.S. conference was 15%. A U.S. Department of Justice survey conducted in
the mid-1970's revealed that most rebates in U.S. trades were set at the legal maximum. See U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE REGULATED OCEAN SHIPPING INDUSTRY 30 (1977).
78. Most economists characterize shipping conferences as cartels. See, e.g., Bennathan & Walters,
supra note 73, at 93.
79. The antitrust laws include the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982); the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982); and the Federal Trade Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1982). For a
description of the specific conference activities that would be prohibited under these acts, see U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 77, at 240-42.
80. Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-42 (1982).
81. Id. § 814.
82. Id. §§ 815-817.
83. Id. § 814.
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United States and the FMC to play a pro-competitive role. Although liner
conferences for U.S. trade routes can fix their rates, the FMC has the
power to review these rates to determine if they are unjust or discrimina-
tory. 4 Moreover, the open conference requirement makes it harder for
conference members to control capacity and thus maintain administered
rates.15 Most non-U.S. trade routes, by contrast, are controlled by closed
conferences and secret agreements."
2. The UNCTAD Code and Bilateralism
Ocean shipping would become less competitive and more highly regu-
lated under a proposal advanced by the less developed countries (LDCs)
through the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD). The UNCTAD proposal87 would establish a system of
cargo reservation designed to increase the share of liner cargo carried by
LDC flag ships at the expense of the traditional maritime nations, includ-
ing European Economic Community (EEC) members and Scandinavian
countries.
UNCTAD was established in 1964 with a mandate to use trade to
eliminate the economic disparities between developed and developing
countries. 8 Liner shipping became an early focus of UNCTAD because
many LDCs asserted that the developed countries dominated the confer-
ence system. These LDCs also charged that the developed countries pe-
nalized the developing economies by excluding LDC liners from confer-
84. Id. § 813(a).
85. Most independent economists agree that closed membership makes it easier for a conference to
agree on and defend administered rates, and leads to higher rate levels. For a theoretical discussion of
this point, see E. BENNATHAN & A. WALTERS, supra note 70, at 8-9, 32-33. The presence of open
conferences may make it difficult for the conference to prevent members from dissipating the potential
profits available under administered prices by engaging in service (i.e., sailing frequency) competition
to increase their market share. See Devanney, Livanos & Stewart, Conference Ratemaking and the
West Coast of South America, 9 J. TRANSPORT ECON. & POL'Y 154 (1975).
The high levels of service competition under open conferences have led some FMC economists to
argue that rates might be lower if services could be "rationalized" (i.e. reduced) under closed confer-
ences. Although shippers might prefer a combination of slightly less service and lower rates, such a
combination is less likely to result from closing conference membership than from maintaining open
membership and eliminating the antitrust immunity for collective ratemaking. For an argument in
favor of closed conferences, see Ellsworth, supra note 5, at 497, 502, 515-17. See also Hanson, Regu-
lation of the Shipping Industry: An Economic Analysis of the Need for Reform, 1980 L. & POL'Y
INT'L BUS. 973, 980-81, 987-91. But see U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 72, at 32-33; E.
BENNATHAN & A. WALTERS, supra note 70, at 32-33; and the studies of U.S.-Brazil trades cited in
notes 113 through 116.
86. E. FRANKEL, REGULATION AND POLICIES OF AMERICAN SHIPPING 214 (1982).
87. U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, Final Act
and Annexes, Annex I, TD/CODE/11/Rev. and Corr. 1 (1974).
88. For a concise discussion of the establishment of UNCTAD and its goals for the shipping
industry, see E. FRANKEL, supra note 86, at 197.
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ence membership and by charging more to ship raw materials than
manufactured goods. 89
Pressures from the developing world led to a 1973-1974 UNCTAD
conference that adopted a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences over the
opposition of the developed countries.9" The code affirms the right of
LDC shipping lines to join conferences governing their home trade
routes. 91 It also establishes a "40/40/20 rule," which assures the national
carriers of each trading partner at least 40 percent of the cargo, while
carriers from other countries ("third flag" carriers) can carry up to 20
percent.9" Other provisions give national shipping lines effective veto
power over all conference matters related to their trades, 3 establish vague
standards against discriminatory tariffs,' require "consultation" with
shipper organizations on rates,' 5 and mandate minimum notice periods for
general rate increases."
The UNCTAD Code was to have been implemented among its
signators on Oct. 6, 1983,' 7 when it satisfied the requirement that it be
signed by at least twenty-five countries representing at least 25 percent of
the world's liner tonnage." None of the nearly 60 developing and commu-
nist bloc countries" that have signed the Code, however, has passed the
domestic legislation to implement it.100 Although no developed countries
outside the communist bloc have agreed to the code, the EEC in 1979
announced its intention to sign if three modifications were made. Those
89. For an excellent discussion of the developing countries' complaints against the conference sys-
tem, see 2 TRG WASHINGTON GROUP, INC. & MANALYTICS, INC., THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
U.N. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LINER CONFERENCES: A STUDY OF U.S. OPTIONS 11-15, 41-42 (1981)
(report prepared for the U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration) [hereinafter
cited as U.S. OPTIONS].
90. The UNCTAD Code can be found at United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment, Secretariat, Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences (1974). For a description
of the provisions of the code, see E. FRANKEL, supra note 78, at 221-39; U.S. OPTIONS, supra note 89,
at 15-28.
91. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 90, at art. 1.
92. Although the code does not advocate a specific cargo reservation formula, the 40/40/20 split
can be inferred from Article 2 of the Code, which states that the national carrier groups shall receive a
"dominant" share of the cargo and that third country shipping lines, if any, shall have the right to
acquire a "significant part, such as 20 percent." See U.S. OPTIONS, supra note 89, at 20.
93. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 90, at art. 3.
94. Id. at art. 13.
95. Id. at art. 11.
96. Id. at art. 14.
97. Code Agreement, Sea Trade, Oct. '83, at 11.
98. E. Frankel & P. Read, Cargo Reservation Agreements: Problems and Alternatives 19-20
(May 1983) (report prepared for U.S. Dep't of Transportation, Transportation Systems Center).
99. Many of the communist bloc signatories have ratified the code subject to the reservation that it
not interfere or replace any bilateral agreements establishing joint shipping line services. Because most
communist bloc trade takes place under such joint shipping agreements, this condition effectively ne-
gates the application of the code to communist bloc trades. Id. at 21.
100. Telephone conversation with Thomas Marchessault and Lawrence Phillips of the U.S. Dep't
of Transportation, Nov. 2, 1984.
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modifications are: (1) that the cargo reservation provisions not apply in
trades among EEC countries or between the EEC and members of the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in-
cluding the United States and Japan; (2) that the lines of the EEC coun-
tries be considered as a group in calculating cargo shares with LDCs; and
(3) that limitations be placed on the veto power of national shipping
lines.'01 UNCTAD has not yet indicated whether it will accept these con-
ditions. Whether or not the code is implemented, however, many develop-
ing countries have announced their intention to apply cargo reservation
and other code principles on a bilateral basis. Indeed, Argentina and Bra-
zil unilaterally applied cargo reservation to their trade routes with the
United States in the 1970's.O2 Several countries-including Venezuela,
Korea, and the Philippines-have made similar requests.1 03
Widespread application of the code or similar bilateral agreements
would produce dramatic changes. Shipping lines of the LDCs undoubt-
edly would increase their shares of cargo, whereas shares of developed
countries, particularly the EEC and Scandinavian countries, would proba-
bly decline. The United States stands as something of an exception among
developed countries in that its shipping industry might gain from cargo
reservation. Because of higher wages and more restrictive work rules, U.S.
flag lines capture only a modest 28 percent of liner cargo in United States
trade (whether measured by weight or value).'" The code would ensure
that U.S. lines receive at least 40 percent.' 05
101. U.S. OPTIONS, supra note 89, at 47-48.
102. E. G. Frankel, Inc., The Impact of Bilateral Cargo Access Agreements on the U.S./Brazil
and Argentina Liner Trades 7 (1983) (report prepared for the U.S. Department of Transportation,
Office of the Secretary).
103. Telephone interview with Lawrence T. Phillips, Office of Industry Policy, U.S. Dep't of
Transportation (May 1983).
104. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL MARITIME ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES
OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES 283 (1983) [hereinafter cited as FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES).
105. See supra text accompanying note 92.
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TABLE 4
Percentage Of Cargo Carried By National Carrier Groups In Trade
Routes Between The U.S. And LDCs, 1979
Not adjusted for flag Adjusted for flag
National carrier group of convenience of conveniencea
Less developed countriesb
As national flag 14.7 21.1
As third flag 6.6 9.6
Subtotal 21.3 30.7
United States 31.0 31.4
Scandinavia and Europe 27.7 32.7
Japan 3.1 3.4
Other OECD 0.2 0.2
Centrally planned 1.7 1.7
Flags of convenience 15.1 _
Total 100.0 100.0
aThe nationality of the owners of ships registered under flags of convenience was estimated on the
basis of a sample of ships.
blncludes all countries which are not in Europe, OECD members, or centrally planned.
SOURCE: TRG WASHINGTON GROUP, INC. AND MANALYTICS, INC., 3 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
U.N. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LINER CONFERENCES: A STUDY OF U.S. POLICY OPTIONS 7, 19 (1981)
(prepared for the U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration).
The UNCTAD Code or bilateral cargo reservation agreements are
most likely to govern trade routes between developed and developing
countries. Table 4 shows that in trade routes between the United States
and the LDCs, for example, U.S. carriers average 31.0 percent of the
cargo carried and LDC carriers average 21.3 percent, of which 14.7 per-
cent is in their home trade routes and 6.6 percent is in trade routes be-
tween the U.S. and other LDCs ("cross trades"). Carriers from other
countries, mainly from Scandinavia and the EEC, capture the remaining
47.7 percent of the market. If ships registered under flags of convenience
(such as Panama and Liberia) are allocated to the national carrier groups
of their owners, the LDC share of U.S.-LDC trades jumps to 30.7 per-
cent (21.1 percent in home trades and an additional 9.6 percent in cross
trades). These statistics may exaggerate the shares of the less developed
world, however, because all countries outside the OECD, Europe, and the
Communist bloc are counted as LDCs, including South Africa and Tai-
wan. Regardless of this exaggeration, the LDC share in U.S.-LDC trade
Yale Journal on Regulation
routes falls short of the 40 percent target incorporated in the UNCTAD
Code.
3. U.S. Maritime Policy
Despite the possible advantages to U.S. liners from the Code or bilat-
eral cargo reservation agreements, the United States has steadfastly re-
sisted such agreements as part of its generally pro-competitive policy to-
ward international shipping."' U.S. maritime policy is not completely
and consistently pro-competitive, however, since even more than in avia-
tion, maritime policy serves multiple and conflicting objectives. As in avia-
tion, one key concern is to ensure low rate and reliable service for U.S.
shippers and consumers; this objective is usually pursued by promoting
competition among carriers. But U.S. maritime policy also is concerned
with a second objective of maintaining a sufficiently large U.S. fleet to
meet emergency national defense needs. 107 The goal of promoting an effi-
cient market conflicts with the objective of protecting the domestic indus-
try for defense purposes more in maritime than in aviation policy. U.S.
liners, unlike U.S. air carriers, tend to have relatively high costs and fre-
quently cannot survive in a highly competitive environment.'0 8
Thus, despite its generally pro-competitive policy and largely in the
name of national defense, the U.S. government protects the American
shipping industry through a variety of anti-competitive mechanisms. Like
most other nations, the United States has "cabotage" laws that restrict
domestic and coastal shipping to its own ships.'0 9 U.S. "cargo preference
laws" also require that certain U.S. government agencies ship their freight
on U.S. vessels. These laws cover all military cargos,"O goods bought with
government loans,"' and half of all foreign aid and military assistance
shipments."" In addition, the U.S. government offers operating and con-
struction subsidies to offset the difference between the cost of building and
106. For a comprehensive but somewhat dated overview of U.S. maritime policy, see S. LAW.
RENCE, UNITED STATES MERCHANT SHIPPING POLICIES AND POLITICS (1966). For a more recent but
less complete discussion, see E. FRANKEL, supra note 67, at 37-38 (1982); U.S. CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. SHIPPING AND SHIPBUILDING: TRENDS AND POLICY CHOICES 5 (1984).
107. See Hazard, A Competitive US. Maritime Policy, 22 TRANSP. J. 32, 34-37 (1982); U.S.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 106, at 45.
108. Id. at 23-32.
109. "Cabotage" is a French term for coastal trade. Cabotage laws restrict trade between two
points on the coast of the same nation to ships of that nation. Foreign vessels engaged in U.S. coastal
trade were subject to discriminatory tariffs in 1789, Act of July 20, 1789, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 27 (repealed
1790), and such trade became a monopoly for U.S. shipping in 1817, Act of Mar. 1, 1817, ch. 31, 3
Stat. 351. Since the development of aviation, the term cabotage has been extended to include air travel
between any two points within a nation.
110. See 10 U.S.C. § 2631 (1982); and 46 U.S.C. § 1241(b)(1) (1982).
111. See 46 U.S.C. § 1241-1 (1982).
112. See 46 U.S.C. § 1241(b)(1) (1982).
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operating a ship in the United States and in a foreign country." 3 Only
ships serving selected, "essential" trade routes are eligible for these subsi-
dies, however, and the current Administration has announced its intention
not to award further long-term subsidy contracts.""
Despite these market interferences, U.S. maritime policy is considerably
more pro-competitive than that of most other nations, including the tradi-
tional maritime powers of Europe. The United States supports open con-
ferences and encourages third flag participants."' The review of confer-
ence agreements and rates by the Federal Maritime Commission also
contributes to this pro-competitive stance."' As part of its pro-competitive
strategy, the United States has traditionally opposed cargo reservation
agreements, whether in the form of the UNCTAD Code or individual
bilateral agreements. The only exceptions to this policy are agreements
with most of the United States' communist trading partners and with Bra-
zil and Argentina. These agreements, however, were signed only because
cargo reservation is the general policy of the communist bloc and an inevi-
table price of communist bloc trade. The Brazil and Argentina agreements
were unilaterally imposed by those countries." 7
The United States has found it easier to resist restrictive bilateral
agreements in ocean shipping than in international aviation because most
countries recognize the freedom of a ship to call at any port. This recogni-
tion makes it unnecessary for two countries to negotiate a bilateral agree-
ment before ocean shipping service between them can begin." 8 Moreover,
because bilateral agreements are seldom used, ocean shipping is also sel-
dom subject to restrictions like those on gateway airports and passenger
traffic found in aviation. The U.S. government is increasingly isolated in
113. There are more than a dozen programs that provide operating and construction subsidies for
U.S. flag ships. For a brief description of these programs, see U.S. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
supra note 106, at 61-63. See also E. FRANKEL, supra note 71, at 109-18.
114. Because the operating subsidy contracts made with ship owners have terms as long as 20
years, the U.S. government will continue to pay substantial subsidies for many years after it stops
signing new subsidy contracts.
115. For a discussion of past U.S. policy and the rationale for greater support for open confer-
ences, see H. REP. NO. 53, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 178.
116. For recent reviews of U.S. policy toward conferences, see Hazard, supra note 107; R. Kyle,
Review and Evaluation of Analyses on Economic Impact of Rate and Service Competition by Ocean
Liner Companies (June 1983) (report prepared for the U.S. Dep't of Transportation, Transportation
Systems Center).
117. The origins and terms of the Brazil and Argentina agreements are explained in E.G. Fran-
kel, Inc., supra note 102; and Manalytics, Inc., The Impact of Bilateral Shipping Agreements In The
U.S. Liner Trades (May 1979) (report prepared for the U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Maritime
Administration).
118. BOOZ-ALLEN & HAMILTON, INC., supra note 12, at vi, 53.
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its opposition to cargo reservation, however, and U.S. shipping interests
are pressing the government to change its position." 9
B. The Policy Argument Against Cargo Reservation
Despite its popularity in much of the international community, cargo
reservation would not be a desirable U.S. policy. Most proponents of
cargo reservation argue that it would aid the U.S. shipping industry and
thereby enhance our national defense. They reason that if the United
States were to adopt cargo reservation rather than provide direct aid to
shippers, foreign citizens would bear some of the expense of aiding U.S.
shipping (in higher shipping charges) and none of the costs would appear
in the government budget. Nevertheless, because a 40/40/20 rule would
increase the shares of LDC as well as of U.S. carriers, U.S. shippers (i.e.,
customers of shipping companies) would be forced to subsidize (through
higher rates) the inefficiencies of both U.S. and LDC carriers. This
double subsidization could make the real cost of cargo reservation to the
U.S. economy as high as that of direct aid, if not higher. 2 '
Cargo reservation is not only an expensive method of promoting na-
tional defense, but also encourages artificially high shipping rates. One
reason to expect higher rates is that cargo reservation reduces the incen-
tives for shipping lines to compete with each other for traffic. U.S. liners
currently capture only 31 percent of the cargo in U.S.-LDC trade routes
because of their higher rates, and some of this cargo moves on U.S. vessels
only because of preference laws and operating subsidies. 2 ' If the proposed
40/40/20 rule were in effect, more commodities would have to move on
expensive U.S. merchant ships, reducing the need for U.S. liners to com-
pete for traffic. Similarly, cargo reservation would reduce the incentives
for LDC carriers to become or remain efficient, or to offer high-quality
service to attract cargo. Liner companies therefore might not retire or re-
119. See CONTAINER NEWS, July 1981, at 13.
120. The defense benefits from increasing U.S. liner shipping through cargo reservation might
also be modest. Although the U.S. merchant marine has a long history of supporting the national
defense, dating from privateers of the Revolutionary War to the Liberty and Victory-type ships of
World War II, it may not play an essential role in future wars. The threat of nuclear conflict has
reduced the likelihood of protracted and large-scale conventional warfare. The development of mili-
tary air cargo and forward logistics systems has also reduced the need for merchant shipping in more
limited engagements. Most importantly, the container revolution in shipping is undermining the close
relationship between military and commercial shipping technologies. The old, small general cargo
vessels that could unload anywhere are being replaced by larger and more specialized ships that
require special shoreside loading facilities. Although there may be military defense benefits from an
expanded merchant marine, the recent changes in strategy, air cargo costs, and commercial shipping
technologies have reduced the benefits significantly. See Hazard, supra note 116, at 34-37; U.S. CON-
GRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 106, at 45.
121. See infra text accompanying notes 110-113.
Vol. 2: 107, 1984
International Markets
place ships as often. They might also eliminate service to smaller ports,
thereby forcing local shippers to pay additional freight charges and to suf-
fer delays in moving cargo overland to larger ports.
Cargo reservation also tends to raise shipping rates because it prevents
liner companies from using their ships and crews as efficiently as possible.
Most bilateral trade routes have more cargo moving in one direction than
the other, 22 and some minor routes generate volumes of cargo too low to
support frequent or convenient liner schedules by themselves. 2 S Liner
companies solve this problem by scheduling the same ship to serve several
trade routes on a single voyage, often operating the ship as a third flag
carrier for part of the journey. 2 4 By restricting the market shares of third
flag carriers, cargo reservation agreements make these cost-saving prac-
tices much more difficult. 2
Any increase in shipping rates harms the economies of both trading
parties in much the same manner as high import or export duties. Both
countries suffer, because liner imports become more expensive for domes-
tic consumers and because liner exports become less competitive in foreign
markets.126 The LDCs may be particularly vulnerable because exports
and imports make up larger shares of their domestic economies. 127
The experience with existing bilateral agreements lends some support
to the predictions of higher rates and poorer service. The three available
analyses of such agreements-all of which examine U.S.-Brazil
trade-are incomplete and reach conflicting conclusions.' 28 Each study
found, however, that liner trade with Brazil has stagnated since the re-
strictive agreement was signed in 1970.129 Two of the studies argue that
the average Brazil-U.S. tariff has increased at about the same rate as av-
erage tariffs in several other comparable trades in the past decade.' The
third and more convincing study, however, found that tariffs per ton-mile
122. FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES, supra note 104, at 315.
123. See L. KENDAL, THE BUSINESS OF SHIPPING 41 (1973).
124. See id. at 127-44.
125. Id.
126. See generally P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 627 (11 th ed. 1980).
127. 1983 INT'L FIN. STATISTICS Y.B. 72, 76, 84, and individual country tables; R. LIPSEY, P.
STEINER & D. PURVIS, supra note 58, at 796.
128. E.G. Frankel, Inc., supra note 102; Manalytics, Inc., supra note 118; Kearney Management
Consultants, The Impact of Bilateral Shipping Agreements: An Analysis of Service, Rates, and Ship-
per Responses (Jan. 1983) (report prepared for the Danish Shipowners Association, the General
Council of British Shipping, the Norwegian Shipowners Association, and the Swedish Shippers Asso-
ciation) (paper on file with the YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION).
129. See E.G. Frankel, Inc., supra note 102, summary and conclusions at 2. Unfortunately, there
is no way to determine with certainty whether this stagnation was caused by the agreement or by
other factors.
130. Id. at 89-91; Manalytics, Inc., supra note 118, at 9.
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are substantially higher in Brazil-U.S. trade routes.' 31 Two of the three
studies also found that the quality of service on Brazil-U.S. routes has
declined, as evidenced by older ships and less containerization.1 32
The theoretical fear that cargo reservation leads to an inefficient market
thus appears to be borne out in practice. Regulated shipping reduces com-
petition and generates inefficiencies, thereby leading to higher costs and
lower quality service. As a result, U.S. consumers and shippers clearly
would benefit from a more pro-competitive government maritime policy,
even if U.S. shipping lines faced more uncertain prospects as a result.
C. Preventing or Neutralizing Cargo Reservation
Cargo reservation is not inevitable, despite its popularity in many
quarters. As in the case of international aviation, the United States stands
in a strong position to block the movement toward increased 'regulation of
international shipping. By using market forces as well as its own trading
strength, it can discourage LDCs from implementing cargo reservation or
other restrictions and can undermine the restrictions that are
implemented.
1. Dissuading the LDCs Directly
LDCs sometimes insist on cargo reservation, as the U.S. experience
with Brazil and Argentina demonstrates. Moreover, given the benefits to
the United States of trade with developing countries, accepting a restric-
tive bilateral agreement is almost certainly better than completely elimi-
nating commerce with LDC trading partners. 3 Nevertheless, just as the
United Kingdom eventually conceded that aviation restrictions were not in
its best interests," the LDCs pressing for cargo reservation may realize
that shipping restrictions may not work to their benefit. The United States
might dissuade some LDCs from adopting restrictive policies by demon-
strating that such agreements will divert cargo to other modes of trans-
131. Kearney Management Consultants, supra note 128, at 13-18. This study is more convincing
than the others because it does a more detailed, commodity-by-commodity comparison of U.S.-Brazil
trade before and after the 1970 agreements. The results of the study have been criticized, however,
because one of the five comparison trades was the North Atlantic, which is denser and better balanced
than the Brazilian trade. The comparison also used data from 1982, an economically weak year when
stronger than usual competition in conferences without cargo reservation agreements may have oc-
curred. Telephone interview with Robert Christensen, U.S. Dep't of Transportation, Federal Mari-
time Administration (May 24, 1983).
132. Kearney Management Consultants, supra note 128, at 1, 25; E.G. Frankel, Inc., supra note
102, summary and conclusions at 3.
133. Trade is voluntary. If trade persists despite the higher rates brought about by cargo reserva-
tion, then the two countries must be better off with trade than they would be without it.
134. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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port, other countries, or other products, and by observing that such diver-
sion would hurt them more than it would hurt the United States.
a. The threat of diversion.
If a small number of nations institute cargo restrictions unilaterally,
market forces normally will divert trade away from the liners serving
these nations because of the higher cost of doing business with them.' 3" At
first glance, however, the threat of cargo diversion might not appear great,
since shipping charges amount to only 10 to 20 percent of the total deliv-
ered cost of most liner-carried commodities." 6 Even if estimates include
measures of the quality of service, such as the costs of inventory in transit
or unreliable delivery dates, transportation probably accounts for no more
than 30 percent of the delivered cost of most liner goods. If cargo reserva-
tion raised the transportation costs to a shipper by 50 percent, for example
(not a wholly implausible figure given the experience in aviation),' the
landed price of the commodity would still rise by only 15 percent.' 38
Nevertheless, a modest price increase may have significant effects if
substitute modes of transportation or sources of supply are readily availa-
ble. Several transportation alternatives might play the pro-competitive role
in shipping that charter airlines play in aviation. Tramp shipping is the
most obvious alternative because tramps have the capacity to carry liner
goods. Bulk shipping is also a likely substitute, especially because some
bulk ships take containers on their decks. Finally, air cargo provides po-
tential competition to liner shipping for commodities with a high value-to-
weight ratio.
These alternative transportation modes already carry some of the com-
modities carried by liners. The extent of this involvement provides one
measure of the potential competition these alternative modes offer. Table
5 gives data on the 20 standard industrial commodity groups that account
for the largest volume of U.S. imports. As the table shows, liners carry
less than 60 percent of all imports in 10 of the top 20 commodity groups,
60 to 80 percent of imports in 7 of the top 20 groups, and more than 80
percent in only 3 of the 20 groups. Most of the competition comes from
tramp or bulk shipping, especially in iron and steel, motor vehicles, fruits
135. This diversion away from higher cost suppliers will be most significant for the commodities
which have high elasticities of demand; i.e., those commodities for which close substitutes are available
from other foreign sources of supply or from domestic producers. E. BENNATHAN & A. WALTERS,
supra note 70, at 19.
136. J. Gomez-Ibanez & I. Morgan, Is A Competitive Maritime Policy Workable? Lessons from
International Aviation 32-33 (Aug. 1983) (report to U.S. Dep't of Transportation).
137. See supra Table 1.
138. J. Gomez-Ibanez & I. Morgan, supra note 136, at 31-33.
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and vegetables, and metal scrap. Air transportation is a significant com-
petitor in certain commodity groups, such as electronics, clothing, and tex-
tiles. Ground transportation is also important for commodities imported
from Canada and Mexico.
International Markets
TABLE 5
Percentage Of Top Twenty Commodities Imported To The U.S. By Liner And Other
Modes, 1980
Commodity Percent of all U.S. imports Imports from largest
group, ranked arriving by LDCa
by tonnage of Ocean Tramp or Percentage Name






































22.8 61.5 0.2 15.5
74.0 1.5 0.1 24.4
5.0 South Korea*
0.1 Israel
66.2 5.8 7.5 20.5 10.7 Taiwan
85.7 7.4 0.4 6.5 23.7 Brazil*
47.7 22.5 0.6 29.2
17.8 50.7 0.5 31.0




39.0 3.9 48.1 9.0 11.5 South Africa
85.1 4.5 0.2 10.2
33.8 7.4 23.3 35.5
72.5 3.0 18.5 6.0
64.2 14.1 2.6 19.1
22.7 61.2 3.3 12.9
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Table 5, continued
Commodity Percent of all U.S. imports Imports from largest
group, ranked arriving by LDCa
by tonnage of Ocean Tramp or Percentage Name
liner shipments liner other vessel Air Ground of total of LDC
Clothing and





equipment 70.6 1.4 12.8 15.2 14.4 Taiwan
Specialized
machinery for
industry 54.1 8.1 12.3 25.5 1.0 Taiwan
Fish and fish




appliances 26.0 1.1 56.2 16.7 10.9 Malaysia*
Tires and
tubes 80.3 1.6 0.2 17.9 8.4 South Korea*
*Country is a signator to UNCTAD Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences or has a bilateral cargo
sharing agreement with the United States.
alncludes all countries other than European countries, OECD members, and countries with centrally
planned economies.
SOURCE: The percentage of imports arriving by all ocean vessels, air, and ground transportation is
calculated from U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. General Imports: World Area by Commodity
Group, Annual 1980, report no. FT-155 (1981). The relative shares of imports arriving by liner and
non-liner shipping are assumed to be the same as the relative shares of imports and in-transit ship-
ments arriving in the U.S. by liner and non-liner shipping; data on imports arriving by vessel are
from unpublished figures supplied by the U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administra-
tion, Division of Statistics. The top twenty liner commodity groups are taken from U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION, MARITIME ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE
ROUTES, 1980-1981, at 190 (1983).
If the commodity groups are further subdivided, one can find some spe-
cialized'products for which liners account for nearly 100 percent of ship-
ments. Nonetheless, tramp, bulk, or air shipping do not have to compete
in every market segment to put significant competitive pressure on liners.
In fact, the alternative modes need only capture some marginal markets
and nibble at a few traditional liner specialties to pose a substantial
threat.13 9 As discussed above, charter airlines caused significant problems
139. Economists have long understood that a market served by only one firm (or, in this case, one
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for the scheduled international airlines in the late 1960's and early 1970's
by capturing only 15 to 30 percent of the North Atlantic air market. ' "
The potential diversion of trade to other countries that supply the same
or substitute commodities provides an even greater threat to the LDCs.
The statistics in Table 5 indicate that, in 13 out of the top 20 liner com-
modity groups, no single LDC supplies more than 10 percent of U.S.
imports. In many commodity groups, moreover, the most important sup-
pliers are not signatories to the UNCTAD Code... and therefore are not
necessarily committed to cargo reservation. Using more detailed commod-
ity classifications, it is also easy to identify commodity groups for which a
single LDC is the dominant source of supply. For example, Brazil sup-
plies 78 percent of the coffee imported to the United States and the Phil-
ippines supplies 96 percent of imported mahogany veneers."" Trade in
these goods could easily be diverted to other countries: Venezuela, Colom-
bia, and the countries of Central America are also major coffee exporters
and easily could become alternative suppliers to the United States. Simi-
larly, other Asian and African countries might become sources for U.S.
imports of mahogany. Moreover, these import figures understate the pos-
sibilities for substitution because they ignore domestic sources of supply
for many commodities.
Estimated price elasticities1"" of imports and exports in international
trade further confirm the potential for substitution. Several studies based
on relatively broad commodity classifications indicate that the price elas-
ticities of imports to a developed country exceed one for most commodity
groupings, and that elasticities of two or more are relatively common.' 44
Moreover, because the estimates assume that the prices of all foreign
sources of supply rise at the same rate, they understate the potential for
diversion from a single country. The elasticities also would be higher if
cartelized industry) still may be extremely competitive if there is easy entry to and exit from that
market by other firms. See Baumol, Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry
Structure, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1982); Bailey & Friedlaender, Market Structure and Multiproduct
Industries, 20 J. ECON. LIT. 1024 (1982).
140. Smithies, supra note 26, at 238.
141. Table 5 shows that Taiwan, for example, supplies about 10% of U.S. imports of metal
manufactures and rubber. Hong Kong supplies about 26% of U.S. clothing imports. Neither of these
countries is a signatory to UNCTAD.
142. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. GENERAL IMPORTS: WORLD AREA BY COMMODITY
GROUPING, ANNUAL 1979, at 1-2, 1-6, 3-239, 3-505 (Report No. FT-155).
143. The price elasticity of demand is defined as the absolute value of the percentage change in
demand for a good in response to a one percent increase in the good's price. The higher the elasticity,
the more demand is sensitive to price. See R. LIPSEY, P. STEINER & D. PURVIS, supra note 58, at 84.
144. See, e.g., Stone, Price Elasticities of Demand for Imports and Exports: Industry Estimates
for the US., the E.E.C. and Japan, 61 REV. ECON. & STAT. 305, 312 (1979); Houthakker & Magee,
Income and Price Elasticities in World Trade, 51 REV. ECON. & STAT. 111, 125 (1959); Goldsbor-
ough, International Trade of Multinational Corporations and Its Reponsiveness to Changes in Aggre-
gate Demand and Relative Prices, 28 INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF PAPERS 573, 573-99 (1981).
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they were estimated for more narrow commodity groups for which the
opportunities for substitution are greater. In short, the price elasticities for
imports from a single country specializing in a few commodities probably
are very high, indicating a high degree of substitutability those between
commodities and alternative commodities.
b. Relative risks to LDCs and the United States
Taken together, the possibilities for substituting other transportation
modes, sources of supply, or alternative commodities suggest that the
threat of diversion may be at least as effective in liner shipping as it is in
international aviation. Moreover, these significant opportunities for diver-
sion imply that cargo reservation may impose very different risks on dif-
ferent countries: If an LDC insists on cargo reservation with all or most
of its trading partners while the United States generally resists such reser-
vation, the LDC risks substantial harm to its economy with little chance
of offsetting benefit. The United States, on the other hand, risks relatively
little.
The principal benefits to the LDC from cargo reservation are possible
increases in shipping revenues and in the size of its shipping lines. The
major costs of such a policy are potential losses of export trade and possi-
ble increases in the prices that domestic consumers pay for imports. These
benefits and costs vary in importance depending on whether the LDC
predominantly exports or imports commodities carried by liners.
Most LDCs that have significant liner trade with the United States are
primarily importing U.S.-made liner commodities.14 Cargo reservation
can help the carriers of importing LDCs, but only under circumstances
that entail serious costs for the LDCs' consumers. Assuming that the
LDC pursues a consistent policy of cargo reservation with all its trading
partners, consumers in that country cannot avoid higher liner charges by
importing from other countries. If the LDC consumers can substitute
other transportation modes or domestic commodities, however, the LDC
liners will not gain any traffic. And, in the unlikely event that there are
no substitute modes or domestic commodities, the LDC carriers will bene-
fit from cargo reservation, but only at the expense of increasing prices for
the LDC's consumers. To add insult to injury, the LDC's consumers will
145. In 1981, liner imports from the United States exceeded liner exports to the United States for
14 of the 19 LDCs with the highest volume of oceanborne liner trade with the United States. For 11
of these 14 countries (including Hong Kong, Korea, and Argentina), liner exports to the United States
were at least half as large as liner imports from the United States. The only LDCs where liner
imports vastly exceeded liner exports were the oil-producing states of Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, and
Nigeria. FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES, supra note 104, at 315.
Vol. 2: 107, 1984
International Markets
be forced to subsidize U.S. shipping as well as their own national carriers
because both lines will be guaranteed a share of the cargo.
A significant minority of LDCs export more liner goods to the United
States than they import."" Cargo reservation may be even more risky for
these LDCs because, in the absence of substitute transportation modes, it
almost certainly will increase shipping prices. Given the trade statistics
and elasticities cited above, buyers of the LDCs' exports probably will
switch to alternative sources of supply or substitute commodities. Both ex-
ports and shipping volumes will drop, providing the national carriers little
gain from higher prices. Moreover, the drop in exports will harm the
export sector of the economy. Thus, the country's economy will suffer
substantial loss with no offsetting benefits.
The United States, by contrast, faces relatively little risk from a policy
of resisting cargo reservation regardless of the predominant direction of its
liner trade with the LDC. If an LDC insists on cargo reservation, U.S.
exporters and importers will face higher shipping costs for trade with that
LDC. This will not place U.S. exporters at a great disadvantage, how-
ever, because the LDC's policy of imposing cargo reservation on all its
trading partners will penalize competing exporters in similar fashion.
Moreover, if the United States resists cargo reservation wherever possible,
U.S. consumer prices will not rise substantially because U.S. importers
will be able to shift to trading partners with no restrictive agreements.
One can argue, of course, that by not supporting cargo reservation the
United States is missing an opportunity to help its national carriers. If the
United States took such a position, however, it would put itself in the
same unhappy position as the LDCs. There is no guarantee that the res-
ervation scheme actually would help U.S. carriers and, if it did, it could
only do so by seriously damaging the rest of the U.S. economy.1
47
2. Promoting Competition Despite Cargo Reservation
Some LDCs probably will insist on cargo reservation for symbolic or
political reasons, even though such a policy works against their economic
146. In 1981, liner exports to the United States exceeded liner imports to the United States for 5
of the 19 LDCs with the highest tonnage of oceanborne liner trade with the United States. These five
countries were Taiwan, Brazil, South Africa, the Philippines, and Ecuador. Id. at 315.
147. Cargo reservation agreements could be designed in ways that mitigate some of the usual
negative impacts. Sufficient competition within each national carrier group, for example, would main-
tain incentives for low rates and high service. Similarly, the maintenance of some minimum third flag
rights, perhaps at the 20% level suggested in the UNCTAD Code, might allow fairly efficient use of
ships and crews. Regional or multilateral cargo reservation, in which each national group is guaran-
teed a minimum share of the cargo for an entire region rather than for their particular trades, might
also permit more efficient ship operation than simple bilateral agreements. Multilateral cargo reserva-
tion has been proposed in E. Frankel & P. Read, supra note 98, at 55-56.
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interests. The aviation experience suggests that the United States still
could maintain a level of shipping competition by encouraging cargo di-
version and by adopting strategies designed to undermine enforcement of
cargo reservation agreements.
To encourage diversion to other shipping modes, for example, the
United States should resist any attempts to extend the UNCTAD Code or
other forms of cargo reservation to cover tramp and bulk shipping. The
United States might also increase the degree of competition among liners
by negotiating for large third flag market shares, for the formation of sev-
eral competing national carrier companies, and for the use of competitive
bidding to allocate cargo reserved for the national carrier group among the
liner companies.
To maintain the threat of diversion to other suppliers or countries, the
United States should explicitly play one trading partner off against an-
other. If forced to accept cargo reservation with one LDC, the United
States should resist such agreements with LDCs that export similar com-
modities. 4 The possibility of increasing their exports should give the
other LDCs a strong incentive to cooperate with the United States.
The United States also might undermine enforcement of cargo reserva-
tion agreements by insisting that liner conferences, rather than national
governments, take responsibility for policing and enforcement. If the liner
conference is the responsible enforcement agency, investigations or sanc-
tions for violations of the agreement may not have the force of law."4
More important, individual conference members may have such divergent
interests that the conference as a whole cannot agree on an effective inves-
tigative strategy or meaningful sanctions. The aviation experience illus-
148. Such a policy by the U.S. government also may be essential to avoid regional or multilateral
cargo reservation agreements. These agreements may discourage or even prevent trade diversion. A
regional cargo reservation agreement with Latin America, for example, would substantially reduce the
opportunity for U.S. coffee importers to avoid high shipping costs by switching suppliers. Some indus-
try observers advocate regional or multilateral agreements as a means of improving vessel and crew
utilization despite cargo reservation. Because most trades are imbalanced and some are thin, carriers
would gain enormously from the flexibility in routing and scheduling that regionalism would permit.
In effect, such agreements would allow a limited amount of third flag carriage (although only by
regional carriers) and thereby improve shipping efficiency. See id. at 56.
This argument for regional or multilateral agreements is most plausible, however, only in a world
where most or all countries have adopted the UNCTAD code. If cargo reservation applies only to a
fraction of the trades, a comprehensive regional reservation system might bring only modest improve-
ments in liner efficiency at the cost of major losses in the potential for trade diversion. Some of the
efficiency benefits might be gained in bilateral agreements, moreover, simply by insisting on a signifi-
cant share for third flag liners. Finally, multilateral or regional agreements may place the United
States at a serious bargaining disadvantage because agencies such as UNCTAD tend to operate on the
"one nation, one vote" principle. In a regional conference supervising a cargo pool, for example, blocs
of smaller LDCs are likely to outvote the United States.
149. Under the UNCTAD Code, enforcement is left up to the conferences, with no government
involvement. Conferences are free to adopt lists of improper practices but there is no government
review to ensure enforcement. E. FRANKEL, supra note 86, at 229.
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trates the problems of conference enforcement. IATA members whose
marginal costs were low enough to make discounted fares profitable had
strong incentives to cheat on conference tariffs (e.g., by offering hidden
rebates to travel agents) in order to capture a larger share of the market.
Cheaters publicly defended IATA fares and supported some nominal en-
forcement efforts in the hope of deterring other members from cheating.' 50
These members, however, did not support effective enforcement or severe
sanctions for fear that they might be applied to themselves.
Shipping conferences would face similar cheating problems in attempt-
ing to enforce cargo reservation. Each national carrier group or line would
have an incentive to carry more than its share, especially if each thought
that other carriers were not doing so. These potential cheaters would sup-
port enforcement measures effective enough to deter other carrier groups,
but not stringent enough to make cheating difficult or impossible. Thus,
by insisting that cargo reservation agreements not be enforced by national
governments, the United States could undermine the agreements and
thereby foster competition.
D. The Problem of Unfair Competition
Even if the United States government can resist or undermine cargo
reservation, some analysts argue that it should not do so because such
action would subject U.S. carriers to various forms of unfair competi-
tion."' According to this argument, widespread adoption of cargo reserva-
tion by countries other than the United States will induce the LDCs to
increase their own capacity and thereby create excess capacity worldwide.
This excess shipping capacity, it is feared, will be "dumped" in U.S. trade
routes. In retaliation for U.S. policy, moreover, U.S. liners might be ex-
cluded from third flag participation in non-U.S. trade
routes-participation which may be needed to fill U.S. ships on many
routes.15 2 Because U.S. shipping lines are less competitive than U.S. air
carriers, the international aviation experience provides little guidance on
these threats to U.S. liners. Other evidence suggests, however, that neither
the fear of dumping nor the fear of exclusion is well grounded.
The fear of dumping is unwarranted because cargo reservation is un-
150. For a discussion of IATA's attempts to deal with the cheating problem, see Tauber, Enforce-
ment of lATA Agreements, 10 HARV, INT'L L.J. 1, 7-17 (1969).
151. See Ellsworth, supra note 5.
152. U.S. carriers do not enjoy as strong a position in shipping as they do in aviation. See U.S.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 95, at 23-32. In addition, the problems of dumping and
third flag exclusion are not as serious in aviation. Restrictive bilaterals have long been the rule rather
than the exception for air routes not involving the United States, and any excess capacity that might
have occurred has long been dissipated. In addition, aircraft are small enough and air travel volumes
large enough that air carriers can often operate direct flights and do not depend on "third flag" traffic.
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likely to produce significant excess capacity. There are three reasons for
this. First, the LDCs already carry around 38 percent of the cargo in
trade routes between LDCs and developed countries, " which is close to
what their market share would be under the 40/40/20 rule. Not every
LDC achieves the average of 38 percent, of course, and only 26.5 of the
38 percentage points are in home trade routes (the remaining 11.4 being
in cross trades). 1" ' Nevertheless, the LDCs as a group clearly do not have
to increase their shipping tonnage by very much to carry 40 percent of
their own cargo. All that might be needed is some modest reshuffling of
shipping capacity among the LDCs. The second reason that cargo reser-
vation is unlikely to cause a significant increase in worldwide capacity is
that some excess capacity will be absorbed through the normal retirement
and replacement of ships. Assuming a 20-year average life for a ship, 5
percent of total tonnage must be replaced annually. Actual replacement
rates are probably even higher, however, because containerization is mak-
ing some current liner tonnage technologically obsolete. The third reason
not to expect an increase in worldwide capacity is that the LDCs proba-
bly will lease or buy excess ships from other countries. Indeed, LDCs
already have approached several U.S. and European lines about charter-
ing space, in order to gain entry to a trade conference without buying and
operating their own ships. " If such arrangements become widespread,
implementation of the UNCTAD Code might proceed with little or no
dumping.
The second threat, that of LDC's excluding U.S. companies from oper-
ating as third flag carriers in non-U.S. trades, is more difficult to assess.
Even if the United States accepted cargo reservation, it is unclear whether
U.S. third flag rights would be preserved. The UNCTAD Code contains
no guarantees that third flag carriers would be able to continue operat-
ing. 5 The U.S.-Brazil agreement, for example, explicitly excludes other
third flag nations in the absence of a waiver. 157
Moreover, some evidence suggests that third flag traffic is not important
to U.S. carriers, although the data are far from conclusive. One study of
the capacities of national carrier groups in non-U.S. trade routes found
that U.S. liners operating as third flag carriers accounted for 3.3 percent
of the capacity in trades between LDCs and developed countries other
than the United States.1" If this figure is correct, U.S. third flag opera-
153. See 3 U.S. OPTIONS, supra note 89, at 29-31, 48.
154. Id.
155. See id. at 80.
156. See E. FRANKEL, supra note 86, at 221-39; U.S. OPTIONS, supra note 89, at 15-28.
157. See E.G. Frankel, Inc., supra note 102, at 7.
158. U.S. OPTIONS, supra note 89, at 31.
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tions with LDCs would account for perhaps 22 percent of all the cargo
carried by U.S. liners. 6 ' The actual figure is probably substantially lower
than 22 percent, however, and may be as small as 4 percent.16 Of course,
third flag trade may be more important for U.S. carriers than the third
flag share of total U.S. cargo suggests. Some U.S. companies may be more
heavily dependent on third flag traffic than others. Third flag cargo also
may make the difference between profits and losses because it may "top
up" the liners' holds. Nevertheless, the small percentages involved suggest
that the loss of third flag cargo, if it occurs at all, will not be crippling.
Thus, the possibility that other countries might engage in unfair com-
petition against U.S. carriers in retaliation for pro-competitive U.S. poli-
cies poses no greater threat to the U.S. shipping industry than to the U.S.
international aviation industry.
Conclusion
The experience of U.S. aviation policy strongly suggests that the United
States can and should resist pressures for international agreements which
restrict competition by stabilizing market shares, limiting capacity, or
fixing prices. The United States traditionally has encouraged competition
in aviation by avoiding agreements that restrict airline capacity and by
liberalizing the rules governing charter competition. More recently, pro-
competitive U.S. policies have forced a review of international pricing
mechanisms, and the U.S. government has used the threat of diverting
traffic to neighboring countries to establish more liberal bilateral agree-
ments for aviation. As a result, prices and services have generally
improved.
Similar strategies can be employed to resist the growing pressure for
159. According to these estimates, U.S. carriers' third flag capacity between LDCs and developed
countries is about 50% as large as U.S. carriers' capacity between the United States and LDCs.
Maritime Administration cargo statistics show that trade with the LDCs accounts for 58% of all U.S.
carrier cargo in trades with the United States. Assuming the U.S. carriers do not operate as third flag
carriers between LDCs, the percentage of all U.S. carrier cargo from third flag trades would amount
to 22%: (58 X 0.5)/(100 + [58 X .51]) - 22%. See id. at 3, 29-31.
160. Twenty-two percent probably is too high because the rule used for assigning capacity to
trade routes overstates U.S. third flag capacity. The study discussed above, see supra text accompany-
ing note 141, assigned the capacity of a vessel making multiple stops to the trade between the last port
of call in a developed country and the first port of call in a less developed country. Using this ap-
proach, 84 percent of the U.S. third flag operations are either between Japan and the East China Sea
area or between Mediterranean Europe and the Persian Gulf. See U.S. OPTIONS, supra note 89, at
32-33. In reality, most of these vessels are primarily involved in carrying cargo between the United
States and either the East China Sea area or the Persian Gulf. See id. The vessels probably make
intermediate stops in Japan or in Mediterranean Europe because it is easy to do so, but carry rela-
tively little cargo between those countries and the less developed world. See id. If these two routes are
ignored, third flag operations would account for only 4 percent of all cargo carried by U.S. liners.
This figure was calculated using the method described supra note 159.
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cargo reservation in international shipping. Tramps, bulk ships, and air
cargo could provide the same type of competition for liner shipping that
air charters do for scheduled airlines. In addition, international trade ap-
pears to be extremely sensitive to price; hence higher ocean shipping rates
pose a great risk for diverting trade to other countries and commodities.
Indeed, if substitute commodities and shipping modes are as readily avail-
able as they appear to be, the LDCs risk far more serious damage to their
economies by insisting on cargo reservation agreements than the United
States does by opposing them.
Moreover, it appears that the benefits of competition can be achieved at
little, if any, cost to domestic carriers. U.S. airlines do not appear to have
suffered much, if at all, from U.S. opposition to restrictive airline agree-
ments. The risk of unfair competition resulting from opposition to mari-
time cargo reservation agreements also seems small since there is little
excess shipping capacity to dump in U.S. trades and since U.S. liners do
not depend so heavily on third flag traffic that they would suffer greatly
by exclusion from non-U.S. trades.
The lessons of the airline and shipping industries may extend beyond
transportation to other international markets governed by bilateral agree-
ments. Diversionary possibilities similar to those found in transportation
may exist in the telecommunications, clothing, footware, auto, and steel
industries. Because resistance to restrictive trade agreements may be un-
popular in the short run, efforts to increase competition will require ener-
getic U.S. government support. In the end, however, increasing competi-
tion should prove to be the best policy both for the United States and for
world trade.
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